For the past six years, UK-listed Vedanta Resources has been castigated by Adivasi (Indigenous Peoples) groups, environmentalists and human rights organisations, for numerous alleged violations of Indian law. Hardly a month has passed when accusations of illegality – ranging from land encroachment to pollution, bribery and even murder – haven’t exercised campaigners around India and as far a-field as the UK, Norway and the USA. The bulk of these accusations centre on Vedanta’s operations in the Lanjigarh district of Orissa, where the company operates an alumina refinery and covets part of the adjacent Nyamgiri hill range – a potential source of millions of tonnes of high-grade bauxite, the raw material for aluminium. Now, a high-level enquiry, held by India’s central Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), has verified two of the most significant charges laid against Vedanta since 2003: that the company contravened both the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 and the Forest Rights Act (2006).

Meanwhile, although this “case” (in reality several different cases entwined together) is emblematic of the amorality at the heart of India’s most successful and diversified mining company, it is not necessarily the worst. The uniquely rapt critical attention paid to Vedanta’s operations in Lanjigarh has certainly been crucial; both for the (sometimes uneasy) international linkages it has enjoyed, and as a litmus test for just implementation of Indian Indigenous Peoples’ rights.

However, some of the energies applied to halting Vedanta’s activities in this small corner of Orissa might have been better deployed to some of the company’s egregious operations elsewhere….

Read more at http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9991.

See http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9925.

See http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9844.

See http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9810.

London Mining Network and a number of its member groups and associates made submissions to this inquiry.

Volume 1 of the Committee’s report includes conclusions and recommendations. The cross-party Committee of both Houses of Parliament is very critical of what it sees as the UK Government’s lack of commitment to improving the human rights record of UK companies operating overseas, and the incoherence of Government policy on the matter. See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/5/5i.pdf.

Most of the oral and written evidence submitted to the Committee is included in Volume 2 of the report
(see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/5/5ii.pdf) though there are some omissions.

For materials related to the inquiry, including some of the individual submissions made to the Committee, see also http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/UKJointCommittee.

For comments on the Committee’s report, see http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/UKJointCommitteereport.

The role of London-listed mining companies, and mining companies raising finance in London, in human rights abuses around the world is clear from the amount of material on such companies that was submitted to the Joint Committee’s inquiry. Twenty of the eighty-seven published submissions and one of the two unpublished submissions deal wholly or partly with human rights abuses allegedly linked to mining companies with a London connection. Three of the remaining published submissions are responses by mining companies to the serious allegations made against them.

The Committee’s report notes (Volume 1, page 94, section 7): ‘Our terms of reference do not permit us to conduct a full investigation into any specific allegations against individuals and companies. However, in the light of the seriousness of many of these claims, we are persuaded that further action is necessary and we hope that our conclusions and recommendations will contribute to advancing the debate in the UK, both among parliamentarians and the wider public.’

Committee Chair, Andrew Dismore MP, said: “UK multinationals may present a compliant face at home but show quite a different approach when operating elsewhere and some have a woeful record abroad. We were most concerned about the range and seriousness of allegations both in the press and in the evidence we received, including against 18 British companies which are household names.”

In a press release dated 15 December 2009, the Committee called on the UK Government ‘to develop a strategy that clearly sets out the human rights standards which UK businesses are expected to meet. The objective should be an international agreement on business and human rights.’ The Committee called on the UK Government to continue supporting UN Special Representative Professor John Ruggie in his work on business and human rights, and noted that few UK firms meet the ‘due diligence’ standards he recommends.

The press release continued: ‘The Committee notes that the UK’s current strategy gives undue priority to voluntary initiatives, without clear guidance. Business compliance with the voluntary OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is monitored by “National Contact Points” or NCPs. The Committee says the UK’s NCP “still falls far short” of being an effective remedial body. The Committee considers that the UK Government should clarify its policy on business and human rights both at home and overseas.’

London Mining Network draws readers’ attention particularly to the following submissions included in Volume 2 of the report.

• Holly Hill Trust, page Ev 110; deals with Rio Tinto in Ecuador; makes a number of general comments about Rio Tinto’s behaviour which are borne out in the written submissions by Dr Mika Peck and the Colombia Solidarity Campaign and also by the comments of Rio Tinto Representative Sir Brian Fall when giving oral evidence to the Joint Committee: see Volume 2 of the report, pages Ev 27-51
• Dr Mika Peck, page Ev 119; deals with Rio Tinto in Ecuador
• Colombia Solidarity Campaign, page Ev 121; deals with Rio Tinto in Colombia and the right of Indigenous Peoples to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
• Vigeo, page Ev 124; deals with Anglo American and Rio Tinto and mentions also BHP Billiton
• World Development Movement, page Ev 135; deals with UK Government support for mining companies and with GCM Resources in Bangladesh
• Action Aid UK, page Ev 137; deals with Vedanta in India
• Survival International, page Ev 161; deals with Vedanta in India, Gem Diamonds in Botswana, and FPIC
• War on Want, page Ev 164; deals with Anglo American and UK Government support for mining companies
• Forest Peoples Programme and Middlesex University Business School Law Department, page Ev 174; deals with FPIC
• Working Group on Mining in the Philippines, page Ev 179; deals with BHP Billiton, Crew, Rio Tinto and Xstrata
• London Mining Network, page Ev 182; deals with Anglo American, BHP Billiton, GCM Resources, Monterrico Metals, Rio Tinto, Vedanta and Xstrata
• CAFOD and Peru Support Group, page Ev 189; deals with BHP Billiton in the Philippines, Monterrico Metals in Peru and UK Government support for mining companies, and mentions Vedanta-owned Konkola Copper in Zambia
• Harrison Grant, page Ev 193; deals with an unnamed diamond mining company registered on London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and active in Sierra Leone
• Margo Drakos, Tarek Maassarani and Jenik Radon, page Ev 236; mentions South African diamond company De Beers, in which Anglo American is a major shareholder
• Latin American Mining Monitoring Programme, page Ev 257; deals with BHP Billiton and Xstrata in Peru
• Global Witness, page Ev 260; deals with Afrimex, Amalgamated Metal Corporation and Anvil Mining (a Canadian-Australian company with some British connections) and UK Government support for mining companies in the Democratic Republic of Congo; also contains recommendations for tackling abuses
• RAID, page Ev 274; deals with UK Government support for mining companies, particularly Anvil Mining in DRC, and the role of AIM; also contains recommendations for tackling abuses
• Leigh Day and Co, page Ev 293; mentions Afrimex and Rio Tinto
• Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, page Ev 297; mentions Anglo American, GCM Resources, Metals Exploration, Rio Tinto and Vedanta
• Amalgamated Metal Corporation, page Ev 323; response to allegations
• BHP Billiton, page Ev 325; response to allegations; as usual with BHP Billiton, it claims that the allegations contain ‘errors’ without specifying what they are, and that some of the claims are ‘out of date’, without specifying which ones
• GCM Resources, page Ev 342; response to allegations

Roger has 26 years experience in studying the mining industry.

Roger started by comparing Vedanta’s Anil Agarwal with Dick Fuld – the toast of Wall Street three years ago, but whose bank, Lehmann Brothers, collapsed last year because of its toxic assets. Roger claimed that, in a few years time, Agarwal’s Vedanta would be seen in a similar light.

While Roger Moody had not, over many years, deigned to respond to requests to identify “ the world’s worst mining company”, after visiting many of Vedanta’s operations between 2004 and 2007, he could now do so.

Definition of “Risk”

The basic concept of Political risk that investors rely upon must be expanded to look at all socio-economic  aspects of a company’s operations: for instance to examine Vedanta’s responsibility for adverse climate change in its headlong expansion (Mineweb had, a few months ago, identified Vedanta as the most acquisitive of all mining companies during the previous year.)

Who is funding what? Nineteen banks, including Standard Chartered and Barclays, syndicated loans for 6,000 crore (60 billion) rupees in June 2009, towards construction of a coal-fired power plant for the  Jharsaguda aluminium smelter, in Orissa .  What will the greenhouse gas emissions toll be  from this?

The key question for funders must surely be:  for how long should a company be allowed the right to operate in defiance of the law and basic standards – before you say NO FURTHER INVESTMENT  (and withdraw any outstanding financial backing)?

1)      Corporate governance issues:  Agarwal and his family control the company; JP Morgan’s condition, imposed in 2003,  that the board should not be controlled by associates of Agarwal, has continually risked being violated. For two years (in 2007 and 2008) reporters were forbidden to attend the AGM. On several occasions the company has refused to defend its operations to critics; not only at this workshop, but also, most recently, in regard to Survival International’s case against the proposed Nyamgiri bauxite mine (Orissa). This was submitted  to the UK government’s OECD National Contact Point in December 2008 and,  on October 10th ,the UK government ruled against the company. Vedanta failed to submit counter-evidence to Norway’s Council on Ethics, following The Council’s scathing report on the company’s global operations in 2007. After the Norwegian government  disinvested from Vedanta in 2007, it sent the Council a letter, purporting to  be a denial of the key charges, which the Council rejected as “adding nothing new.”

2)      Violations: The company has been guilty of numerous violations within India and in Zambia. Three years ago the Armenian government  threatened to sue Sterlite Gold for £46 million for numerous violations at its Zod gold project.  In the event, Agarwal sold his Armenian properties to a Russian company, quit Armenia, but ensured that Sterlite Gold itself would be bought by Vedanta, at a profit to himself.

3)      Reputational and legal issues: A significant amount of corporate finance has been raised in international markets, in 2006 and earlier this year, for overall expansion of parlous projects (notably in the company’s aluminium and iron ore sectors). But it should not be forgotten that much of this funding is earmarked for Vedanta’s acquisition of  shares in two companies it does not yet fully own: Malco (Tamil Nadu) and BALCO (Chhattisgarh).

4)      Minority shareholders in the former have militantly tried to preserve their stake and prevent its being discounted, with little success. The Indian government – which privatised the country’s third biggest integrated aluminium producer to Sterlite seven years back – has belatedly tried to preserve its own minority stake of 49%; a price for which has still not been determined to the satisfaction of the government. During the same week that an estimated 45 workers died at the BALCO-owned power plant construction site in Korba, Chhattisgarh, a case was presented to India’s Supreme Court (via its Central Empowered Committee)  that BALCO illegally acquired land for the expansion of its Korba facilities, felling thousands of trees on reserve forest land. The Goa state environmental authorities recently ordered dozens of mines to “show cause” why they should be allowed to operate – including at least one controlled by Vedanta (through its subsidiary Sesa Goa).

Vedanta’s Kolli Hills bauxite mine in Tamil Nadu was ordered shut by the High Court in 2008, as a result of  pubic interest litigation by a local citizen who demonstrated that the mine had been illegally operated for several years.

These are not isolated instances; they demonstrate an intrinsic failure on the part of the company to operate to a minimal degree of social responsibility.

As graphic evidence of this, at the conclusion of his presentation, Roger Moody showed a short video clip depicting the appalling conditions suffered by sub-contracted labourers (including children) employed at Vedanta/BALCO’s bauxite mine at Bodai-Daldai, Chhattisgarh.  But, on two occasions during the company’s annual general meetings (2006 and 2007) Mr Agarwal and his board had been shown this evidence (by way of photos) and had promised to “investigate” and address any violations. He had signally failed to do so.

In June this year, the central Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests’ own Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC, mining)  reported on  an  inspection of this mine and the plight of Indigenous villagers removed their homes, which was carried out in February 2009.  The EAC concluded that the company’s behaviour had been so unacceptable that, even if now promised to remedy all its errors (of commission and omission) it could  not be trusted   to do so.

Vedanta’s request to expand the mine was therefore rejected.

2006

May 2006: Vedanta fined 50,000 Rupees by Delhi High Court, after Orissa environmental activist, Prafulla Samantara wins right to testify to the to company’s  alleged illegal construction of its Jharsaguda smelter

2007

May 2007: Highly respected VV Giri Institute, Delhi, issues report claiming most of labour-related guarantees made by Sterlite on privatisation of BALCO have been violated

March 2007: Orissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB) directs Vedanta to halt all construction activities at its Jharsaguda smelter site, since it has not obtained environmental clearances [The Hindu, 11/3/07]

May 2007: Armenian Government fines Vedenta subsidiary Sterlite Gold a preliminary penalty of US$46 million for numerous violations of its contract at Zod gold operations [Mining Journal 11/5/07]

October 2007: India’s Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) indicts Balco for its “deplorably callous and casual attitude” to environmental appraisal of the consequences of mining bauxite in Chhattisgarh state [Livemint, Delhi, 31/12/07]

November 2007:  Norwegian Government’s pension fund indicts Vedanta as “grossly unethical”, after two year assessment of company’s activities, primarily in India and Zambia. The Council on Ethics report says:
“In cases of severe unethical activities, we try to use our ownership to make the companies change their behaviour; however, the violations of Vedanta are so serious and we don’t see any initiative from the company to change its past record.”

2008

November 2008: while granting a permit to Sterlite to expand its Tuticorin copper smelter,  the MOEF’s Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) finds the company’s final Environmental Impact Assessment “inadequate”, with failures in assessing continuing ambient air pollution (SO2 and NOx) inter alia [MoEF report]

November 2008: Madras High Court orders immediate halt to what it calls Vedanta/Malco’s “illegal mining” of bauxite on the Kolli Hills, Tamil Nadu  – a lease which expired ten years earlier in 1998

2009

February 2009: Police register a case against Anil Agarwal and Vedanta company officers, for allegedly illegally cashing a 12 billion dollar bank guarantee provided for construction of its Jharsaguda smelter township [Times of India, 28/2/09]

March 2009: Delhi High Court delivers judgment that Anil Agarwal and other officers of Sterlite Industries must “pre-deposit” US$70 million pending further hearing on findings by the state Enforcement Directorate of India’s Foreign Exchange Management Act, that Sterlite had illegally acquired and transferred around US$420 million [at today’s rate] of foreign currency in 2004 [Mines and Communities, 2/6/09]

July 2009: The MOEF’s EAC (Expert Appraisal Committee- mining) finds that Vedanta subsidiary, Balco, has violated basic rules on resettlement of families evicted from its Bodai-Daldali bauxite mine in Chhattisgarh; and that, whatever remediation the company proposes or puts into place, it must not be allowed to expand its operations at the mine,  in light of “the past records of the company” [EAC minutes, Delhi 2-3/6/09]

July 2009: Orissa State Pollution Control Board  issues show-cause notice to Vedanta Aluminium Ltd for numerous violations of water and air pollution control acts at its Jharsaguda smelter [New Indian Express, 23/7/09]

September 2009: Nine year old Aakash Naik wins Order from Bombay High Court that Vedanta must immediately cease mining at two pits in Advalpal, north Goa, due to unacceptable pollution

For further details, please contact: info@minesandcommunities.org

See http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9504.

Concerns raised at the Vedanta plc AGM, Monday 27 July 2009

The following is a summarised version of notes taken at Vedanta’s annual shareholders’ meeting by a member of London Mining Network. It is intended only as a guide to what happened at the meeting, and should not be considered a verbatim record. Questions and responses in this summary are grouped thematically and are not recorded in chronological order.

This summary does not attempt to convey the atmosphere of the meeting, which was extremely lively. Many of the Board’s comments were greeted with derisive or incredulous laughter or groans. There was much heckling and a number of well-informed interruptions from the floor. There were loud complaints when it was clear that the Chair was dodging a question. There was applause for criticisms of the company’s behaviour. At one point, members of the Board were themselves talking over one another as they attempted to defend their record.

Orissa

Sitaram Kulisika, a representative of Dongria Kondh communities opposed to Vedanta’s plan to mine in the Niyamgiri Hills, said (through an interpreter): “Last year in this meeting you promised that you would not mine Niyamgiri without permission of the Kondh community there, the indigenous people living there. And my people, in thousands, they have sent me to tell you that we are not going to leave Niyamgiri at any cost and we want to continue in that area, living in Niyamgiri. And I appeal to all of you to support us in our struggle and help us to protect our living god Niyamgiri and our community that has been living in their homeland for generations. Thank you.”

The company gave no response (after having responded to an earlier more general question on the issue of the protest outside the building).

Bianca Jagger said that she had read the commitment that the company makes to sustainable development. She said she was attending the AGM because she is concerned for the rights and indeed survival, of the Dongria Kondh people. She was concerned about the environmental impact of the proposed mine. She noted that the Central Empowered Committee of the Indian Supreme Court had said that mining in a sensitive forest area should not be allowed. She said that the company must understand the importance of perennial water sources. Removing the bauxite from where the water is collected will have a massive effect on the availability of water for drinking and irrigation. Niyamgiri is a pristine ecosystem with extraordinary biodiversity. Why would the company go ahead with a mine in the Niyamgiri Hills and destroy a pristine forest? With challenges to the environment globally, including climate change, would the company commit not to mine there?

Company Chairman Anil Agarwal said that the project would bring benefits to the area, including employment, and that mining had not yet begun and could not begin until the relevant permissions had been granted. He said that the company believed in the Government of India and challenged critics to accept Indian sovereignty. He said that India had experienced double-digit economic growth, and asserted that such activities were required as economic growth must continue.

Stephen Corry, Director General of Survival International, asked why the company had not responded to the complaint which Survival had brought against it to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). For the Board, Naresh Chandra suggested that Mr Corry wanted Orissa to be administered from the UK. He said that the best legal brains in India had made the arguments for and against the project and that the project had an Environmental Impact Assessment. He said that one of the people who had evaluated it was a Nobel prize winner. He said that the project would bring jobs and electricity, that the area was very backward and that the people are poor. The Government of India had taken up the matter with the OECD (after discussion with the company). It was a matter for the Indian Government, not for a foreign body.

Mining researcher Roger Moody pointed out that Vedanta is a British registered company and that Mr Chandra was deliberately confusing the issue. The company has a Board in Britain and is regulated by the British Financial Services Authority. Mr Chandra answered that the project was subject to environmental clearance from the Indian authorities, not the British.

Agrotosh Mookerjee, an actuary, said that the financially quantifiable costs of the deforestation which the project would cause are far greater than the economic benefits mentioned. He also called on the company to comment on the recent criticisms of the project by Amnesty International and the decisions by the Norwegain Government’s Sovereign Pension Fund and the Martin Currie Scottish Trust Fund to withdraw investments from the company because of human rights concerns.

The company responded that it is following all the rules. Some people like the company, some do not. Those who did not were welcome to disinvest. The company was not aware of an Amnesty report and demanded that Mr Mookerjee quote a source. The company would do nothing unless presented with facts.

Peter Frankental of Amnesty International said that corporate best practice involves conducting a Human Rights Impact Assessment. To date, the company has not conducted such an assessment either of its Lanjigarh refinery or its proposed mine on Niyamgiri. The EIA made no mention of human rights. How could the company know that the projects would have no adverse impacts on human rights for the entire life cycle of each project?

For the Board, Mahendra Medha responded that the company’s Sustainability Report was very people-focussed. He said that human rights are central to the Indian constitution, that any human rights concerns should be taken up with the National Human Rights Commission in India, and that the company would consider the matter fully if consulted further.

Samarendra Das said that in the last five years a number of the company’s opponents had been killed, including Sukru Majhi in 2005. Names of those murdered should be made public. The company said that it could not answer questions on murders. Samarendra pointed out that there had been a protest of 300 people against the company three days before the AGM and that earlier in the year up to 10,000 people had formed a human chain to protest against the company’s operations.

Other speakers urged that the company not mine in the Niyamgiri Hills without the permission of local people. The company chairman’s response was always that the company had not started mining, that there had been public hearings and would be more of them, and only after those would mining start. They insisted they followed Indian laws.

Film-maker Simon Chambers said that he had seen children loading lorries with bauxite by hand at other operations of the company. Three weeks before the AGM he had seen fly ash dumped in the jungle near the Lanjigarh refinery. He had seen houses and crops covered in white dust from the refinery. None of this was mentioned in the company’s sustainability report. Anil Agarwal said that this was new to him. Simon pointed out that he had told him about the child labour at the AGM three years ago and that Mr Agarwal had promised to look into the matter after being shown photographs, but had not done so. Anil Agarwal said that dumping of fly ash was not company policy and that he would look into it. Naresh Chandra said that any company employee found responsible would lose their job.

Felix Padel said that there had been numerous complaints against the company by the Orissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB) for violations of the law by the company’s Lanjigarh refinery, and at its aluminium smelter construction site in the state. He said that many of the company’s critics at the AGM had the highest regard for Indian law but that implementation could be poor. He said he was shocked that the company was denying that there was forest at the top of the mountain which it wished to mine, and that even a Supreme Court judge had denied that the Dongria Kondh had any part in the matter, when it was clear that the Dongria Kondh hold the mountain sacred and protect its forest by not cutting trees there. The voice of the Dongria Kondh was not being heard.

Anil Agarwal replied that he was very offended that the Chief Justice of India was being criticised. He implied that the criticism was racist. He said that the OSPCB had inspected the operations at Niyamgiri and given clearance in May. This point was contested.

In response to a representative of Action Aid, Anil Agarwal said that the Government of India had asked the company to devote 5% of annual profits to benefit local people.

One shareholder noted that the company had illegally built a road in the protected forest. Anil Agarwal suggested that a complaint against the company could be lodged in Indian law.

Two shareholders claiming to be from the region stated that there used to be problems in the area but Vedanta had brought hope by bringing development such as medical care, education and the promise of jobs.

Goa

Dr Sreedhar Ramamurthy explained that the company’s operations in Goa had caused serious flooding in villages near the company’s mine wastes. He passed around photographs showing the damage done and asked what remediation the company had undertaken. Would there be continuity of management and what commitments would the company make regarding the impacts of its mine?

Anil Agarwal said that he did not know about the flooding. He promised to investigate. He said that India had large reserves of bauxites and was only mining 5 – 10% of it. He said that Vedanta was a FTSE company, that it would emulate international best practice and put the best people on the job.

Dr Ramamurthy said that it was very sad that the Chairman of the company did not know about the flood that had affected the villages in Goa and that it caused him pain that the company management was so ill-informed about the impacts of its operations.

Chhattisgarh

Another shareholder pointed out that the Indian Supreme Court’s Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) had found that among the 260 or so families displaced by the company’s Bodai-Daldali project, 189 families had not been resettled. Families without clear legal title had not been compensated, even though the sums of money involved are tiny compared to the company’s resources. The EAC had ruled that the project should not be expanded until these matters were resolved. Roger Moody, directly citing the EAC’s June 2009 final report, added that expansion should in any case not happen, that he had raised the matter several times at company AGMs and that he wanted a commitment that the company would not expand its Bodai-Daldali operations.

Mahendra Medha replied that this showed that the Indian regulatory system does its job and that the company’s critics should trust it. The company would not mine without permission (which was not being given here), but it was important to mine to bring prosperity to India’s backward adivasis.

Tamil Nadu

Roger Moody pointed out that the company had mined without permission in the Kolli Hills in Tamil Nadu. This was why the company had had to close the mine. Mahendra Mehta responded that the company closed the mine because it did not need it, and that it was seeking permission to reopen it. Roger Moody asked why the company was seeking permission to reopen a mine that it did not need. It was clear that the company had had to close it because it was mining without permission.

Zambia

Simon Chase of ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa) pointed out that the company had boasted of cost savings at KCM in Zambia. He said that the company had been making wholesale job cuts and was not protecting the livelihoods of sacked workers. At the same time, the company was saying that it hoped to develop another mine at Lyuanshya and was protecting workers and communities. Is this a ploy to get the Government to renege on its policy of increasing corporate taxes?

Anil Agarwal claimed that the company was doing professional work there, increasing production and reducing costs through new technology as well as supporting education projects in local villages. He said that Lyuanshya had now been bought by other companies.

Independence of the Directors

Andy Whitmore of Indigenous Peoples’ Links pointed out that the company, though listed on the London Stock Exchange, was in fact a family run company. What would the Board do to ensure that it is independent?

Naresh Chandra stated that there was nothing wrong with family run companies, and that people fixated on Mr Agarwal, whereas no-one complained about, for instance, Bill Gates. This led to further arguments over the company’s claims to work to the highest standards, when even the company’s own report on corporate governance noted only some of the potential conflicts of interest.

See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/church-accused-of-unethical-investment-in-aluminium-mine-1719999.html

For a video on community resistance to Vedanta in India, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f0o1PhmTjEQ

Vedanta has also come under heavy criticism for its activities in Armenia and Zambia.

See

http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9287 http://www.counterpunch.org/servant05292009.html
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8492
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8279

See http://www.counterpunch.org/servant05292009.html.

See http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9198